Differenza tra il sistema filosofico di Husserl e quello di Cornelius: Il primo confronto di Adorno con la fenomenologia

Abstract

This article provides a close reading of Theodor Adorno's 1924 dissertation on Husserl, shaped by the ideas of his academic mentor Hans Cornelius. It opens with a brief overview of Cornelius's transcendental-empiricist theory of knowledge (immediacy, memory, and the object as a law-like nexus of phenomena) and his objections to Husserl. It then reconstructs the dissertation's two movements: first, the critique of the thing's transcendence through an account of subjective constitution; second, the analysis of noema and epoché, where the alleged immunity of sense is challenged by its dependence on experiential change. By analyzing Adorno's rejection of the immediacy of thing-perception and his reinterpretation of objects as immanent relations among experiences, the article highlights an early formulation of themes that will culminate in his later engagement with Husserl and in negative dialectics as a whole: the critique of ontology, the role of mediation, and the historicity of meaning.